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ABSTRACT 
The literature on transnational regulatory networks identified interdependence as their main 
rationale, downplaying domestic factors. Typically, relevant contributions use the word 
“network” only metaphorically. Yet, informal ties between regulators constitute networked 
structures of collaboration, which can be measured and explained. Regulators choose their 
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Competition Policy (CCP) of the University of East Anglia on 24 February 2017 and the participants to 
the workshop on Varieties of Capitalism and Independent Regulatory Authorities (IRAs) held during 
the ECPR Joint Sessions 2017 for their insightful and constructive feedback. Replication materials are 
available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/JPublicPolicy.  
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frequent, regular network partners. What explains those choices? This paper develops an 
Exponential Random Graph Model of the network of European national energy regulators to 
identify the drivers of informal regulatory networking. The results show that regulators tend 
to network with peers who regulate similarly organised market structures. Geography and 
European policy frameworks also play a role. Overall, the British regulator is significantly more 
active and influential than its peers, and a divide emerges between regulators from EU-15 
and others. Therefore, formal frameworks of cooperation (i.e. a European Agency) were 
probably necessary to foster regulatory coordination across the EU. 
Keywords 
Regulatory networks, Learning, Energy, SNA 
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1. Introduction 
Since the early 2000s, the literature on transnational regulatory networks (Raustiala 2002, 
Slaughter 2004, Slaughter and Zaring 2006, Berg and Horrall 2008, Verdier 2009, Zaring 2009, 
Ahdieh 2010, Newman and Zaring 2013) and on European Regulatory Networks (Eberlein and 
Grande 2005, Coen and Thatcher 2008, Kelemen and Tarrant 2011, Maggetti and Gilardi 2011, 
Thatcher 2011, Van Boetzelaer and Princen 2012, Maggetti 2013, Blauberger and Rittberger 
2015, Mathieu 2016) has literally boomed. The pervasiveness of informal networks in policy 
and politics has fuelled academic investigation about their origins, their functioning, and their 
effectiveness. Comparatively less research has focused, however, on the inner side of 
network collaboration. What are the criteria according to which regulators choose whom to 
network with? In other words, what are the drivers of regulatory networking? This paper 
answers this question by analysing network ties among National Energy Regulatory 
Authorities from EU Member States.  
The governance literature has converged on the overarching understanding that 
transnational (or trans-governmental) networks are meant to improve the governance of 
economic sectors or phenomena, whose reach extends beyond any single country. Within 
networks, regulators have the opportunity to exchange information and to coordinate their 
regulatory practice in order to facilitate cross border trade and investment. These conclusions 
resonate with the stances of the liberal school of international relations (Keohane and Nye 
1974, Keohane 1998), which has emphasised how increased interdependence motivates 
transnational cooperation and coordination, leading to the creation of international regimes 
(Haas 1980, Keohane 1982). In this view, regulators network transnationally in order to tackle 
the challenges of interdependence while reaping the opportunities.  
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Beyond interdependence, the drivers of regulatory networking have rarely been investigated. 
Recent explanations have pointed to the importance of autonomy and resources in 
prompting regulators to network transnationally (Vestlund 2015, Bach, De Francesco et al. 
2016). Moreover, existing literature usually employs the word “network” as a useful 
descriptive metaphor, but rarely studies it as a relational structure (Isett, Mergel et al. 2011). 
Yet, the real thrust of networks resides in the connections between the nodes forming them. 
Regulators maintain informal network ties with peers from other countries because they find 
it worthwhile. Even when semi-formal networked organisations (such as European Regulatory 
Networks) exist, individual regulators are unlikely to maintain regular bilateral ties with each 
and every one of their peers; more plausibly, they sustain bilateral frequent ties to a subset 
of peers, reaching out to others more sporadically. 
In this article, I investigate the drivers of regulatory networking by analysing the directed 
network of connections between the 28 National Energy Regulatory Authorities of EU 
Member States, plus Norway. I develop an Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM) 
premised on hypotheses aimed at testing whether the structure of the energy sector (in 
electricity and gas) at national level holds relevance for explaining the structure of the 
informal network of collaboration of European energy regulators. In doing so, I rely on the 
theoretical link between Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) (Hall and Soskice 2001, Hancké, Rhodes 
et al. 2007) and regulatory arrangements in network industries and hypothesise that 
regulators network more with peers who oversee similarly organised markets.  
The results of the analysis show that regulators are, indeed, homophilous in their tie choices. 
Namely, this study finds that similarity in the structure of the energy sector across countries 
is a powerful determinant of network ties for some clusters of regulators. Moreover, the 
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British regulator emerges, all else equal, as considerably more active and influential than its 
peers, and a divide is observable between regulators from EU-15 and others. The results of 
the model also indicate that more resourceful regulators are both more active and more 
popular networkers, contradicting the expectation that regulators with lower (budgetary and 
staff) resources use their informal collaboration network to compensate for those by having 
more outgoing links than their more resourceful peers. 
Overall, these results lend support to contributions underlining the importance of expertise-
driven policy learning as the driving force of transnational regulatory networking. Although 
co-membership in EU policy initiatives and transnational flows of electricity and/or gas 
partially explain network structure, similarity in energy sector structure is associated with 
much higher odds of tie existence. However, the homophily effect is strongest for newer 
Member States, suggesting they form a rather detached clique from the core of the network. 
If placed in the context of European energy market integration, this result suggests that the 
establishment of a European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) was 
probably necessary to compel EU energy regulators to coordinate with and learn from all of 
their counterparts, as well as to spur convergence across the whole EU. 
 
2. The determinants of network ties: literature review and hypotheses.  
The structures of interconnection among a set of nodes can be measured and explained using 
Social Network Analysis (SNA). The usage of SNA for transnational or national networks of 
civil servants or other regulatory official has recently made inroads into the social sciences, 
as shown by the growing number of contributions employing the technique (Alcañiz 2010, 
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Cranmer and Desmarais 2011, Ingold, Varone et al. 2013, Maggetti, Ingold et al. 2013, Alcañiz 
2016, Boehmke, Chyzh et al. 2016, Cranmer, Leifeld et al. 2017, Lazega, Quintane et al. 2017).  
Scholars have conceptualized transnational regulatory networks as the functional response 
to economic interdependence. Networks have been shown to affect rule adoption across 
countries (Maggetti and Gilardi 2011, Maggetti and Gilardi 2014) via a process of regulatory 
coordination at supranational level. Sociological perspectives have conceptualized networks 
as arenas where regulators can exchange information, opinions and experiences and 
therefore learn from each other (Majone 1997, Humphreys and Simpson 2008, Sabel and 
Zeitlin 2008, Bianculli 2013). In a policy learning perspective, networked cooperation that is 
sustained over time enables regulators to experiment with the outcomes of their 
collaboration, to conceive new approaches to old and new problems (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012).  
More recently, the literature has complemented these understandings with perspectives 
emphasising the importance of domestic determinants for explaining transnational 
networking (Bach and Newman 2014). In particular, contributors have highlighted the 
strategic use that regulators make of their networks to achieve more autonomy from 
government (Danielsen and Yesilkagit 2014, Ruffing 2015) by exploiting the informational 
advantages deriving from transnational networking (Eberlein and Grande 2005, Jordana 
2017). Additionally, regulators appear to pool resources through networking, thereby 
compensating for those they lack (Alcañiz 2010, Vestlund 2015). 
However, the literature has, thus far, overlooked the rationales explaining regulators’ choices 
regarding their network connections. Regulators maintain informal, bilateral network ties, 
because they find it worthwhile. Presumably, however, resource and time constraints prevent 
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regulators from being able to maintain regular communication with all of their counterparts; 
more plausibly, they choose their strong ties. Analyses of the motivations for these choices 
are, however, lacking. Filling this gap requires close-up observation and analysis of the ties 
that each regulator has within a network, as this would allow for a clearer grasp of the aims 
of regulatory networking. 
In this article, I use original network data gathered through email and phone inquiries from 
all 28 energy regulatory authorities of EU Member States, plus Norwayi. Their self-reported 
bilateral ties constitute a network structure. The model developed in this paper is aimed at 
explaining that structure. The literature on European Regulatory Networks (key contributions 
include Coen and Thatcher 2008, Eberlein and Newman 2008, Kelemen and Tarrant 2011, 
Levi-Faur 2011, Maggetti and Gilardi 2011) and more generally on networks of regulators of 
network industries has, thus far, scarcely relied on the richness of insight that network theory 
and network analysis could afford it. In other words, the literature has often used the term 
“network” without using the methods pertaining to the quantitative analysis of networks.  
There are notable exceptions: several contributions have used measurements derived from 
network analysis in order to quantify influence and reputation of different bureaucratic and 
political actors in the Swiss telecommunication sector (Ingold, Varone et al. 2013) or the 
independence and accountability of different regulatory authorities (Maggetti, Ingold et al. 
2013). Few contributions, however, have investigated the explanatory factors of the 
relational structure connecting the members of a network. The mere existence of semi-
formalized frameworks of cooperation, such as European Regulatory Networks, offers no 
insight onto the drivers of informal bilateral ties among regulators. Yet, the importance of 
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trans-governmental networking for the shaping of EU energy policy in particular can hardly 
be overlooked (Eberlein 2008, Kaiser 2009).  
Recent contributions have argued that the “Variety of Capitalism (VoC)” framework holds 
explanatory power with regard to market and regulatory arrangements in national network 
industries (Thatcher 2007, Guardiancich and Guidi 2016). The VoC framework subdivides 
OECD countries according to “the way in which firms resolve the coordination problems they 
face” (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 7) in the country where they operate. The two main types of 
VoC are Coordinated and Liberal Market Economies (CMEs and LMEs). In LMEs, firms 
predominantly coordinate their activities via markets. In CMEs, firms rely more heavily on 
relational modes of coordination with other actors in the political economy than on market 
signals. In Continental Europe, CMEs are the majority. The only European countries classified 
as LMEs are the United Kingdom and Ireland (Hall and Gingerich 2009). Moreover, CMEs have 
been further differentiated: Scandinavian countries appear to have a specific type of social-
democracy, different from the coordinated economies of Germany (the only pure CME), 
Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Moreover, Southern European countries (France, Italy, 
Spain and Portugal) have been defined as “mixed” (or “Mediterranean”) economies (MMEs), 
where coordination (or lack thereof) co-exists with an interventionist and compensating 
state.  
Thatcher (2007) studies the interplay between the VoC framework and regulatory institutions 
in network industries in the cases of the United Kingdom (UK), France and Germany. He 
asserts that the EU legislative and regulatory framework for network industries, being 
premised on the goal to foster market competition in the energy sector through the 
introduction of private capital, cost-reflective pricing, market transparency, and unbundling, 
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essentially dovetails the British (and therefore, LME) paradigm, emerged from the 1980s 
privatization and liberalization reforms of UK network industries. This choice, according to 
Thatcher (2007), forced all other Member States to converge towards the LME model of 
regulation of network industries. Indeed, before the EU began legislating on network 
industries, France and Germany relied on very different arrangements: in France, the state 
owned or controlled most of the sectoral firms and steered sector development; in Germany, 
industrial associations performed self-regulatory functions and the state accepted to keep 
itself at a distance, while retaining a monitoring role. Eventually, France and Germany, as all 
other Member States, complied with the requirements of European legislation in formal 
respects, inter alia by setting up regulatory authorities. Closer examination, however, reveals 
that both countries retained the key features of their distinctive mode of coordination in the 
informal networks undergirding the sector at national level (Thatcher, 2007). Thus, in France 
the state preserves a key steering role, while in Germany industry continues leading sector 
development, even though both, at least formally, converged to an LME-type sector 
organisation.  
How does the link between the political economy of a country and its energy sector 
arrangements translate on the transnational arena of regulatory networking? Does national 
sector structure affect regulators’ networking choices? I surmise that they do: on the one 
hand, regulators may seek to establish strong connections with peers dealing with similarly 
organised markets, as they are more likely to face similar challenges as themselves; on the 
other hand, certain national regulators may enjoy more influence than others, prompting 
their peers to seek them out as frequent interlocutors. Since the EU energy legislation is 
premised on a market model corresponding to Liberal Market Economies (LMEs), one should 
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expect regulators from LMEs to receive more incoming ties as all other Member States slowly 
converge (or adapt their extant mode of coordination in network industries) to the LME mode 
of coordinationii. 
In a recent contribution on the European network of broadcasting regulators, Papadopoulos 
(2017) emphasises that regulators learn from peers they hold in high esteem and/or who are 
facing problems perceived as similar, but does not explore this pattern any further. In their 
study of the European network of patent judges, Lazega, Quintane et al. (2017) find that “It 
is clear that judges do sort each other in social networks based on their belonging to blocks of 
countries with similar types of capitalism.” (p. 19). The explanation they provide is that judges 
from similar VoC probably refer to similar bodies of law. The fact that nodes prefer to connect 
to nodes that they perceive as being similar to themselves in some theoretically or empirically 
relevant respect (a pattern called “homophily”) has often emerged as having considerable 
explanatory power in studies of social networks (McPherson, Smith-Lovin et al. 2001, Lee, Lee 
et al. 2012, Barberá 2015). Both studies also note that, within networks, certain regulators 
are much more influential than others and perceived as models by their peers. 
The reason why regulators from countries displaying similar energy sector structures are 
expected to link to peers in similar sector structures is that they are likely to encounter the 
same bottlenecks in the formulation and implementation of regulatory policy. At the same 
time, regulators may seek to establish direct networks to peers overseeing markets that they 
are converging to, in order to learn from their experience and access their expertise, as well 
as to better foresee potential conflicts of interests in their own context.  
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My first hypothesis is, therefore, that European energy regulators’ connections are governed 
by a pattern of homophily (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011) driven by similarity in national 
energy sector structure.  
H1: Regulators network more with regulators overseeing similarly organised markets.  
My second hypothesis is that the UK regulator should be highly sought after by its peers, given 
that all EU Member States have had to converge, at least partially, towards an LME type of 
energy sector organisation.  
H2: Regulators from Liberal Market Economies have significantly more incoming ties than 
their peers. 
The literature has frequently pointed to another factor of great importance to regulators, as 
well as to all administrative organisations, which may affect the likelihood of tie formation: 
resources (Glachant, Khalfallah et al. 2013). Alcañiz (2010, 2016) finds that sudden budgetary 
cuts represent a strong incentive for nuclear experts and regulators to collaborate with their 
peers in transnational joint projects, in order to accomplish their ongoing technical activities. 
This suggests that less resourceful regulators may use informal networking to compensate for 
their lacking resources and should, therefore, display a tendency to have many outgoing ties 
to their peers. These considerations lead me to formulate my third hypothesis. 
H3: Regulatory authorities with lower (budgetary and human) resources are more active 
networkers (i.e. have significantly more outgoing ties than their peers). 
This analysis comprises the full population of European national energy regulatory 
authorities, including those from Eastern European Member States. However, extant analyses 
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of the link between VoC and regulatory institutions in the EU focus on EU-15 Member States 
(i.e. the Member States of the EU before the 2004 and subsequent enlargements). Indeed, 
the original VoC classification by Hall and Soskice (2001) did not include Eastern European 
countries. Scholars have attempted to categorize newer Member States according to existing 
or new VoC typologies. Feldmann (2006) argues that the Baltic countries are closest to the 
LME model, and Slovenia to the CME model. However, Hancké, Rhodes et al. (2007) underline 
that new Member States should be considered as transitioning towards specific models of 
capitalism, and cluster them as Emerging Market Economies (EMEs). Nölke and Vliegenthart 
(2009) label the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic as Dependent 
Market Economies (DMEs), since their type of capitalism development is based on the 
provision of capital through foreign direct investment. 
Examining the structure of the electricity and gas sectors of different Member States (see 
details in Table 4 in the Appendix), however, reveals partial discrepancies between even the 
original VoC classification and the energy sector structure of different EU Member States. The 
most obvious discrepancy concerns the case of Ireland, where the electricity and gas sectors 
are almost entirely under government control, thus preventing a categorization of Ireland as 
an LME. Overall, a neat distinction exists between countries where the transmission and 
distribution segments are owned and operated by different companies, and are separate 
from generation and retail (only the UK) and countries where companies active in distribution 
are also active in retail and sometimes in generation, too (as in most CMEs).  
In the so-called Mixed Market Economies, the dominance of formerly state-owned 
incumbents has been restrained through regulation (as in France), mandatory divestment (as 
in Italy and Greece) or privatization (as in Portugal and Spain); still, former incumbents have 
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the largest market shares. The energy sector structures of Scandinavian countries also show 
commonalities, i.e. a good level of competition in both generation and retail (even though 
state-controlled incumbents are also active in those segments), locally-owned distribution 
systems and state-owned transmission systems. The penetration of foreign capital (mostly 
from Western European national companies) in the generation, distribution and retail 
segments of the electricity sector in several Eastern European countries resonates with their 
classification as Dependent Market Economies (DMEs) by Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009). 
Finally, a prevalence of direct state ownership and control in all segments of the market is 
evident in other Eastern European countries, Cyprus, Malta, and, as mentioned, Ireland.  
In sum, the structure and organisation of the electricity and gas sectors across EU Member 
States show considerable differences in the extent of achieved liberalization and government 
control. The VoC classification derives from the analysis of national political economies and 
the institutions underpinning those. The concept captures the dominant mode of 
coordination in the whole political economy. Although arguably too general to accurately 
portray similarities and differences across energy sector structures of EU Member States, the 
VoC framework appears to constitute a useful heuristic to categorize different sectoral 
arrangements and, therefore, to capture the different circumstances that national regulatory 
authorities face in their domestic setting. Hence, in the model developed in the empirical 
section, regulatory authorities (as identified by the name of their country) are classified as 
per Table 1. 
<< Table 1 about here >> 
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Regulators’ ties choices, however, may hardly be choices at all: geography plays such a 
dominant role in energy infrastructure as to potentially overshadow any other rationale for 
informal cooperation, as regulators are bound to communicate often with regulators from 
neighbouring (or, more precisely, interconnected) countries. Regular communication with 
neighbours, in turn, may engender stable patterns of exchange of information. In order to 
assess this effect, rather than geographic contiguity, one should consider the actual direction 
of the flows of electricity and gas that are transmitted across borders and seas within the EU. 
Consequently, I include electricity and gas flows, both across land and sea, in the analysis, as 
their directionality may be strongly determining regulatory interactions. 
Furthermore, within the context of the EU, exchange of information is mandated by the 
existence of a common EU energy regulatory framework that national regulators have to 
implement at national level. The declared aim of the EU energy policy is achieving a fully 
integrated Internal Energy Market (IEM). As an interim step towards the achievement of the 
IEM, the European Commission has launched the so-called Regional Energy Initiatives for 
Electricity and Gas. The Regional Initiatives group regulators into eight regions for electricity 
and three for gas with the intent of achieving integrated regional markets for both. Frequent 
interaction in the framework of the Regional Initiatives may have engendered socialization 
dynamics leading to trust and thus to the maintenance of ties beyond the official policy 
framework. I therefore include co-membership into the Regional Initiatives as a proxy for the 
relevance of European policy requirements to explain regulators’ informal ties.  
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3. Data and method: an Exponential Random Graphs Model of strong ties 
among European energy regulators. 
The literature on transnational regulatory networks, both European and global, has scarcely 
exploited the power of quantitative network analysis to explain patterns of transnational 
networking. This is plausibly due to lack of data on the connections that individual regulators 
maintain. The contributions that use the tools of network analysis usually concern multi-level 
and multi-actor networks of experts around specific issue areas, such as the environment, 
and usually rely on data concerning co-membership in cooperation initiatives and/or co-
attendance of certain events. The assumed link between co-membership and collaboration, 
however, is not self-evident, as actors may be members of the same initiative but not 
collaborate regularly. Very recent contributions in the policy studies literature have resorted 
to asking network members about their regular and frequent ties to other network members 
(Fischer, Ingold et al. 2017, Hamilton and Lubell 2017) in order to attempt to capture the 
essence of coordination. This analysis adopts a similar approach in studying the empirical case 
of a homogenous network (i.e. comprising one type of actor) of transnational scope: the 
network of ties linking European energy regulators, as reported by regulators themselves. 
I gathered the data used in this paper between the second half of 2015 and late 2016. 
Specifically, I wrote to the Heads of International Affairs departments and to Communication 
Officers of all EU national energy regulatory authorities. Not all regulatory authorities have 
dedicated International Affairs offices, but all have staff dedicated to international affairs, 
such as Communication Officers. I asked these respondents to reply to the following 
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questioniii: “Think of the individuals you (or somebody at your NRA) exchange information 
with more often. Which NRAs do they belong to?”. Network analysis is very sensitive to 
missing data; it is important to possess information on the whole network in order to make 
accurate analyses. Therefore, I chose to rely on a single question in order to maximize my 
chances of receiving a reply from all network members. Indeed, I have obtained replies from 
all European national energy regulatory authorities, bar one. For that missing respondent, I 
have just considered the nominations of other regulators as reciprocated.  
Being aware that the notion of “most frequent” may mean different things to different 
people, and that regular exchanges of information may include mostly routine exchanges 
rather than be occasions for learning, I added to my requests explanatory text specifying to 
respondents that they should name the peers they get in touch with when they seek advice 
or an exchange of opinions or suggestions, not just routine exchanges of information. 
Moreover, I complemented the question with a request to name the regulatory authorities 
with which they are in contact above and beyond European policy requirements (including 
participation into the European Agency for the Coordination of Energy Regulators). I 
guaranteed all respondents anonymity of their identities and their replies.  
The resulting network is a “thinned” network (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011), i.e. a network 
consisting of only the strong relationships between the nodes. If the ties across European 
regulators were a valued network (with ties having different weights depending on their 
importance), the network studied in this paper is the one of highly valued ties. I chose to focus 
on strong ties because energy regulatory cooperation in the EU has a long history, dating back 
since the late 1990s (Vasconcelos 2005). Moreover, European energy legislation imposes an 
obligation on European regulators to cooperate within the European Agency for the 
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Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). Therefore, every European energy regulator is 
connected to all others. I was specifically interested, however, in the informal bilateral ties 
that regulators maintain more regularly and frequently.  
I set up an Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM) of the network of relations among 
European energy regulators. ERGMs represent a technique for inferential network analysis 
where the outcome of interest is a set of relationships (i.e. the ties among the nodes of the 
network) (Cranmer, Leifeld et al. 2017). ERGMs are generative models: the underlying 
assumption is that the observed network structure has emerged from an evolutionary process 
of tie formation over time, which can be explained by the combination of theoretically and 
empirically relevant variables as well as network dependency structures (Robins, Lewis et al. 
2012), such as the tendency for nodes to reciprocate ties, or for triangles to be closed, (i.e. 
the property of transitivity, whereby if node i is connected to j and j is connected to k, there 
is a higher probability that i and k are also connected). The explanatory variables could be 
attributes of individual nodes or attributes of dyadic ties. ERGMs assess the probability that 
the observed network is drawn from the distribution of the network structures that are 
plausible, given the number of nodes and the network density, and the explanatory variables. 
The coefficients of the model are to be interpreted as log odds, as in a logit model.  
The graph in Figure 1 reports the structure of the relations among European energy 
regulators. The network appears characterized by a small number of highly connected nodes, 
a small number of peripheral nodes, and a majority of nodes having an intermediate number 
of connections. Figure 1 shows that two nodes have not been nominated by any of their 
colleagues as their most frequent contacts (hence have an in-degree of zero). Figure 1 also 
shows that most of the ties are reciprocal, which validates the data, considering that I did not 
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set a minimum or a maximum number of nominations for regulators. The promise of 
anonymity concerning respondents’ identities and their replies prevents me from assigning 
labels to all nodes in the graph.  
 
<< Figure 1 about here >> 
 
As mentioned, I expect the ties in this network to depend on both exogenous and endogenous 
factors. As for the exogenous factors, the hypotheses I developed in the previous section 
point to homophily, activism and influence, controlling for EU policy requirements, 
interconnection and flows across borders. I include in the model several endogenous 
dependencies to account for likely patterns of social interaction that may have contributed 
to determine the network structure: the density of the network; the reciprocity of ties; and 
the transitivity of ties. I also include dependencies to account for the centralization of the 
network, i.e. to verify whether the network is more centralized around particularly active (i.e. 
many outgoing ties) or particularly influential (i.e. many incoming ties) nodes than would be 
expected by chance.  
Therefore, the predictors employed in the model include electricityiv and gasv flows, over land 
and sea, across EU Member States (plus Norway); co-membership in the European Regional 
Initiatives for Electricity and for Gasvi; data on each regulatory authority’s budget and staff 
numbersvii; and the above-mentioned categorisation of their energy sector structure. The 
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quantitative data has been standardized before proceeding to the analysis by subtracting the 
mean and dividing by the standard deviation.  
 
Results of the model. 
For the sake of clarity, the hypotheses I formulated are listed in Table 2, together with the 
variables describing them and the factors I use as controls for the effect of interconnection 
and co-participation in EU Regional Initiatives. 
 
<< Table 2 about here >> 
 
The results of the ERG models are reported in Table 3. I performed the analysis using R 
package “ergm” (Handcock, Hunter et al. 2017). The coefficient are log odds, that is, after 
exponentiation, they indicate the probability that an edge exists between two nodes, all else 
equal, i.e. conditional on the rest of the graph being fixed. Positive and high coefficients 
indicate higher odds, while negative and high coefficients indicate lower odds of a tie existing 
between two regulators on the basis of the given parameter. Each explanatory factor was fed 
into the model according to its expected effectviii on the odds of tie existence. 
 
<< Table 3 about here >> 
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Table 3 offers two main takeaways: first, all else equal, regulators do display a tendency to 
maintain close relationships with peers who oversee similarly structured markets, particularly 
in the case of regulators from Dependent Energy Markets and from Coordinated Energy 
Markets; second, the UK regulator is more likely to be at the receiving end of a tie than its 
peers, all else equal. Hypothesis one and two, therefore, are confirmed. The homophily 
pattern could not be tested in the case of the UK and its liberal market model because it is 
unique in the dataset, hence cannot form homophilous ties. Overall, all regulators are 
significantly more likely to receive ties than regulators from energy markets that are 
dependent on foreign investment (i.e. DEMs, the reference category in the models), bar 
regulators from countries where the electricity and gas sectors are mostly under public 
ownership and control.  
In model 3, budgetary and staff resources are operationalized via a continuous predictor and 
refer to the year 2012, and appear to not significantly affect the odds of tie existence. To shed 
more light on the matter, in model 4 I use more recent, categorical data on staff figures 
released by European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER)ix. All else 
equal, regulators with medium staff numbers (i.e. 90 to 140 full time equivalent employees) 
are more likely to be active networkers. Higher budgetary figures are also associated with 
higher odds of outgoing ties, but the effect is rather weak. These results run partially contrary 
to hypothesis three: regulators with low staff numbers do not tend to send significantly more 
outgoing ties than regulators with different staff numbers, all else equal. However, the model 
suggests that regulators with intermediate staff numbers are significantly more likely to have 
more outgoing ties even compared to authorities with large numbers of staff. This effect may 
be the manifestation of a compensatory strategy. Given that variables associated with 
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regulators’ resources do not fully explain regulators’ outgoing ties, in model 5 I examine 
whether sector structure is associated with a higher likelihood of being active networkers. 
Once again, the British regulator appears, all else equal, more likely to have more outgoing 
ties than its peers. 
Furthermore, the results for endogenous dependencies show that ties are very likely to be 
reciprocated. The coefficient on the dependency called “shared partners” should be read in 
conjunction with transitivity. Shared partners indicate the tendency for the nodes in the 
network to have connections in common, whether they are related or not. Transitivity 
indicates whether two regulators that share a strong tie are also more likely to have shared 
partners than would be expected by chance. Hence, in this network there is a tendency to 
have connections in common, which becomes significantly stronger when two regulators are 
connected. In other words, if two regulators have a connection in common, they have higher 
odds of being connected by a strong tie, as well. Finally, there are signs that the network is 
centralized on nodes having high out-degree, i.e. having many outgoing ties, while the 
parameter for centralization of the network around highly influential nodes, although 
positive, fails to achieve significance. This means that regulators cluster around active nodes, 
but not around influential ones, and suggests that regulators use active nodes to increase 
their access to information, including their access to influential nodes.  
As for the other predictors, the models show that regulators that are members to the same 
Regional Initiative for Electricity are more likely to be connected, and that the direction of the 
electricity flows across the EU mirrors the directionality of ties across regulators. Gas Regional 
Initiatives and gas flows never achieve significance. Nevertheless, these effects do not suffice 
to explain the network structure, which appears even more strongly determined by energy 
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sector structure. The coefficients of the ERGM should be interpreted as log odds of the 
probability of a tie existing, given the feature investigated. In the network described by model 
2, the probability of a tie existing (equivalent to the intercept in a regression) is 0.4%. It there 
is a mutual tie, the probability becomes 17%. If two nodes are both from what I defined 
Coordinated Energy Markets (i.e. from Coordinated Market Economies), the probability 
jumps to 40%.  
In order to check for the possibility that the extent of market liberalization in each country is 
the actual explanatory factor for tie homophily and individual regulators’ influence, I run 
additional ERG models. I operationalized market liberalization using two different measures: 
first, by using the market share of the largest electricity generator in each country (Eurostat 
datax); secondly, I used OECD data on network industries regulation (Koske, Wanner et al. 
2015) concerning the extent of government ownership in the largest firm active in each of the 
segments of both the electricity and gas sectors: generation (production or import for gas), 
transmission, distribution, and supply (see Tables 5 and 6 in the Appendix for data and models 
results). None of these variables appears to significantly affect the odds of tie formation, 
exception made for the variable indicating government ownership of the largest distribution 
system operators. This variable shows a negative significant coefficient, which should be 
interpreted as corroborating the results, emerging in other models, regarding regulators 
overseeing energy sectors under government direct control. The extent of market 
liberalization upstream and downstream (i.e. generation and retail) does not, however, 
appear to hold explanatory power for regulators’ network ties.  
Finally, I re-run the main model (i.e. Model 2) using a different categorisation, whereby 
regulators from Member States that entered the EU in 2004xi, 2007xii and 2013 (Croatia) are 
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clustered as a single “Other” category. Merging the two categories of dependent energy 
markets and government-controlled ones has the effect of showing the divide between EU-
15 and newer Member States even more starkly. However, it prevents appreciation of the 
homophily patterns across EU-15 regulators themselves, as category “Other” outnumbers all 
other categories: the model results simply confirm that regulators from newer Member 
States are significantly more likely to network with each other than with the rest of their 
peers, and that EU-15 regulators are much more likely to receive incoming ties than their 
peers from the “Other” category (results available upon request to the author). 
 
Model fit. 
The ERGM defines a probability distribution across all networks of the size of the network in 
the model. If the model is a good fit to the observed data, then networks drawn from this 
distribution are likely to resemble the observed data. As mentioned, ERGMs are generative 
models. They represent the process of tie formation from a local perspective. These locally 
generated processes eventually produce network properties, even if those are not specified 
in the model. One way to assess the fit of a model, then, is to examine how well it reproduces 
network properties that are not in it. To assess model fit, I compare the value of several 
network statistics between the observed network and simulated networks; these are 
edgewise shared partner distribution, minimum geodesic distance, in-degree, and out-
degree. The four plots emerging from the simulation from Model 2 (the preferred model) are 
reported in figure 2. Model 2 appears able to capture network structure considerably well, 
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given its parsimonious setup and clarity. The dark lines, corresponding to observed values, 
fall in the boxplots (simulated values) for nearly all configurations.  
 
<< Figure 2 about here >> 
 
4. Discussion of the results. 
Two main findings emerge from this analysis. Firstly, regulators appear more likely to 
maintain connections with regulators who oversee similarly organised electricity markets; 
this is particularly the case for regulators from what I defined Coordinated, Nordic and 
Dependent energy markets. Secondly and simultaneously, the regulator from the only LME in 
the dataset (the UK) has much higher odds of receiving ties, given its peripheral geographic 
location, than its peers. Given that the whole EU energy regulatory framework and relevant 
legislation are based on a LME-type mode of coordination, this finding can cautiously be 
interpreted as a manifestation of regulatory convergence. The combination of these two 
patterns appears to support Thatcher’s (2007) analysis, which diagnosed convergence of 
other VoC towards the LME model, at least in network industries, but at the same time noted 
the persistence of extant modes of coordination.  Regulators from Mixed Energy Markets, 
where formerly state-owned incumbent retain the bulk of the market share but coexist with 
smaller new entrants, are the least likely to be homophilous in their tie choices; this suggests 
that regulators from these economies are not significantly more likely to maintain frequent 
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ties to peers from their same political economy, but rather have a wider range of regular 
contacts.  
Although the coefficients in model 2 are higher for regulators from coordinated and liberal 
energy markets, all regulators appear significantly more likely to receive incoming ties than 
regulators in the reference category (DEMs), bar regulators from countries where 
government ownership and control across the whole energy sector is prevalent. These two 
categories of regulators, for the most part, belong to newer Member States, which entered 
the EU after 2004.  In short, the models show that, as far as transnational energy regulatory 
networking is concerned, there is a divide between regulators from EU-15 and regulators 
from newer Member States.  
The coefficients for endogenous dependencies indicate that reciprocity is common in this 
network, indicating bonding and reciprocal trust among European energy regulators (Berardo 
and Scholz 2010). Transitivity is also a property of this network, as is relatively common in 
information exchange networks (Fischer, Ingold et al. 2017). Moreover, the model shows that 
some regulators are more active than others, i.e. have more outgoing ties, causing the 
network to be centralized on out-degree, even though the coefficient is not always significant 
across models. These active nodes are plausibly bridging across the network (Berardo and 
Scholz 2010), which would otherwise comprise some isolated nodes. 
Overall, the analysis of this network structure appears to tell a story of policy learning driven 
by expertise as well as by commonality in sector structure and therefore, as per my 
hypotheses, common challenges. The approach I adopted in developing the model is very 
conservative: I included several endogenous dependencies to account for ties that exist 
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because of structural properties of the network, rather than homophily; I also included 
common membership in European Regional Initiatives and electricity and gas cross border 
flows in order to test the strength of regulators’ associations against a powerful constraint for 
network industries, as geography. Furthermore, coordination and collaboration between 
European energy regulators has a long history, dating from the late 1990s, and is embedded 
in a very developed and well-formed supranational legislative and regulatory framework. 
These features show in the network structure, which is overall dense and comprises a single 
component.  
Indeed, that any effect is visible beyond those controls is telling of the strength of the national 
political economy of the sector as a driver of regulatory networking. As regulators are placed 
at the interface between their national markets and the European dimension, they build their 
informal bilateral ties according to both homophily and, arguably, convergence. Interestingly, 
the British regulator also emerges as significantly more active than its peers in model 5, all 
else equal. This finding resonates with Thatcher’s (2007) remark that British politicians have 
often complained of the slow progress of liberalization reforms in other Member States. In 
truth, the British regulatory authority has repeatedly expressed concern over the effect that 
the lower extent of liberalization in other European markets may have on British consumers, 
and underlined its leading role in the network of European regulators in virtually all of its 
annual reports to the European Commission, released since 2007xiii. 
Model 2 is preferred for its parsimony. Indeed, evidence regarding the importance of 
resources for explaining network ties is less than conclusive, even though suggestive of 
interesting patterns. Using categorical instead of continuous data for staff figures, which splits 
regulators into groups according to the number of their full time equivalent staff, avoids the 
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collinearity driven by the very high numbers of staff of the British regulatory authority. Results 
show that regulators with intermediate numbers of staff are most likely to be active 
networkers, which suggests that regulators with small numbers of staff are somehow unable 
to cultivate an extended network, and that regulators with large numbers of staff are not 
significantly more likely to have a higher number of ties compared to counterparts. I run other 
models which indicate homophily among regulators with large numbers of staff (i.e. > 170), 
i.e. regulators with large numbers of staff tend to network with each other. It bears pointing 
out that, perhaps surprisingly, regulatory authorities with large numbers of staff are not 
necessarily those from bigger Member States; that subgroup comprises regulators from the 
UK and Germany, but also from Hungary and the Czech Republic. The energy regulatory 
authority of a large country like France has between 40 and 90 full time equivalent staff units, 
ending up in the medium group. In this case, the impact of resources on the likelihood of tie 
existence is difficult to discern clearly.  
The literature has found that very often policy networks display a core-periphery pattern 
(Knoke 1990, Carpenter, Esterling et al. 2003), whereby there is a cohesive core of densely 
connected nodes and a periphery whose members are poorly connected both to the core and 
among themselves. The intuitive conception of core-periphery structures entails a dense, 
cohesive core and a sparse, unconnected periphery. Core-periphery structures have been 
investigated in the literature on networks (Borgatti and Everett 2000) as well as in the 
literature on the European Union (Magone, Laffan et al. 2016). In the context of the EU, the 
same concept has been applied to frame relations between “old” and “new” Member States 
(Bohle and Greskovits 2012).  
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Finally, the irrelevance of gas in explaining the patterns of European energy regulators’ 
networking is a puzzling results of the analysis. Neither gas flows, nor gas regional initiatives 
appear to have statistical or substantive significance with regard to this network. This may be 
due to the lower control regulators have on the gas sector and the development of gas 
markets compared to electricity. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The main question this paper sought to answer concerned the drivers of informal regulatory 
networking at transnational level. I examined the empirical case of European National Energy 
Regulatory Authorities, tasked with regulating the electricity and gas sectors within their 
national borders and simultaneously asked to coordinate in order to bring about regulatory 
harmonization and foster market integration across the EU. Far from being straightforward, 
this task is ridden with difficulties and setbacks given, as the relevant literature has often 
discussed, that Member States have different administrative, legal and institutional 
traditions. This analysis shows that, faced with these differences, national regulators 
capitalize on the similarities between the markets and sectors they oversee in order to fulfil 
their tasks.  
Differences in the structure of the sector are likely, and have been shown in this paper, to be 
equally important in affecting regulators’ networking practices, as they seek to fulfil the tasks 
bestowed upon them.  
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I hypothesised that regulators would tend to choose counterparts embedded in similarly 
organised markets as their most frequent and stable network partners. I operationalized this 
concept by relying on data on the main stakeholders active in the different segments of the 
electricity and gas markets at national level, their number and the extent of government 
ownership of them. I categorized regulators into separate groups by relying on the Varieties 
of Capitalism framework as a heuristic device to conceptualize the specificities of the 
electricity and gas sectors in the countries considered. I also hypothesised that regulators 
from Liberal Market Economies (in this context, the UK) would receive significantly more ties, 
since the European energy regulatory policy and legislation are shaped according to that 
mode of coordination. Finally, I expected resources to also matter for regulators’ networking 
choices, as less resourceful regulators may seek to fill their informational gaps by linking to 
more resourceful ones.  
The results confirm that similarity of sector structure is, indeed, a powerful driver of 
regulators’ tie choices for most categories of regulators. The hypothesis concerning the 
influence of a liberal market model is also confirmed, and can be interpreted as a sign of 
ongoing convergence, on the background, however, of persisting dynamics of coordination 
typical of national political economies, as found in Thatcher (2007). The hypothesised link 
between lower resources and higher network activism failed to clearly emerge from analysis: 
however, medium sized regulatory authorities do appear more likely to be active compared 
to their more or less endowed counterparts. Moreover, higher budgets are associated with 
more outgoing ties, suggesting that more resourceful regulators have, indeed, more 
resources to devote to networking.  
  
 31 
The endogenous network dependencies indicate that ties in this network tend to be 
reciprocal; the effect for this dependency is very strong, representing an important validation 
of the data, as I did not specify a minimum or a maximum numbers of nominations to the 
respondents. Moreover, regulators tend to close triangles, particularly when two nodes are 
already connected; this testifies to the importance of information exchange relationships in 
fostering trust among the actors involved. The observed network structure features a handful 
of regulators having considerably more outgoing ties than their peers; to account for this, I 
included in the model dependencies accounting for network centralization around active 
networkers. The effect is strong, but not consistently significant. The presence of particularly 
active networkers is, however, important to facilitate exchange among different nodes in the 
network, particularly those with fewer regular connections.  
Overall, regulators from newer EU Member States (i.e. those who entered from 2004 
onwards) appear less integrated into the network structure, suggesting a core-periphery 
pattern. Regulators from Dependent Energy Markets appear as the most strongly 
homophilous and the least likely to receive incoming ties. Regulators from countries where 
government ownership and control across all sector segments predominate also emerge as 
less likely to receive ties than their peers. The presence of scarcely connected nodes in this 
dense network of regulators suggest that forms of structured cooperation, such as the 
European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, are probably necessary in order 
to achieve regulatory coordination across the EU. Structured cooperation impedes the 
formation of cliques or disconnected communities of regulatory authorities, and encourages 
learning and exchange also across widely different institutional contexts.  
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The purpose of the analysis was grasping the invisible and undocumented drivers of 
transnational networking; this entails the important limitation of the impossibility of 
triangulating data with other sources of information. This concern is assuaged by the 
practitioner knowledge of the persons who kindly agreed, under promise of anonymity, to 
respond to my inquiry. Further research may seek to study network evolution over time by 
relying on longitudinal data, as this may help capturing the engines of phenomena, only 
cautiously alluded to here, such as convergence (or lack thereof).  
The models in this paper are cross-sectional; therefore, they do not allow for a full 
appreciation of regulators’ “historical” ties, i.e. whether their connections followed a path 
dependent evolution. ERGMs are premised on the notion that the observed network 
structure emerged as a result of a gradual process of network formation determined by the 
processes that the model itself attempts to capture. Hence, the results of this model suggest 
that homophily, influence, reciprocity and transitivity are essential properties of this network. 
For one, this suggests the co-presence of bonding and bridging social capital (Berardo and 
Scholz 2010); in other words, regulators’ ties are driven both by reciprocal trust and by 
informational needs. Further study of the process of network evolution and change over time, 
however, is necessary in order to capture the fine-grained mechanisms of long-standing 
regulatory collaboration.  
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Figures and Tables  
 
Figure 1 - Visualization of the network.  
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Figure 2 - Goodness of Fit of Model 2: indegree, outdegree, edge-wise shared partners, 
minimum geodesic distance 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 1 - Categorisation of European National Energy Markets 
Type of Energy Market Countries 
Liberal Energy Markets (LEMs) The UK 
Coordinated Energy Markets (CEMs) Germany, Austria, Belgium and the 
Netherlands 
Dependent Energy Markets (DEMs) Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak 
Republic, Bulgaria and Romania 
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Mixed Energy Markets (MEMs) Italy, France, Greece, Portugal and Spain 
Scandinavian Energy Markets (SEMs) Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark 
Government-controlled Energy Markets 
(GEMs) 
Ireland, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 - Hypotheses, Variables and Mechanisms 
 
 
HYPOTHESES VARIABLE MECHANISM 
1 Regulators network more with 
regulators overseeing similarly 
organized energy markets. 
VoC Homophily  
2 Regulators from Liberal Energy 
Markets have significantly more 
incoming ties than their peers. 
VoC More incoming ties 
3 Regulatory authorities with lower 
(budgetary and human) resources 
are more active networkers (i.e. 
have significantly more outgoing ties 
than their peers). 
Budget 
Staff units 
More outgoing ties  
Control 1 The structure of the network of 
relationships existing among 
European energy regulators mirrors 
Electricity 
flows and gas 
flows 
Matrix of network ties 
mirrors matrix of electricity 
and gas flows 
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the paths of electricity and gas flows 
across EU Member States. 
Control 2 The structure of the network of 
relationships existing among 
European energy regulators mirrors 
the subdivision operated through 
the Regional Initiatives for Electricity 
and Gas, respectively. 
Regional 
Initiative 
(electricity) 
and Regional 
Initiative (gas) 
Matrix of network ties 
mirrors matrix of co-
participation in EU 
Regional Electricity and/or 
Gas Initiative 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 - ERG Models of the network of European energy regulators 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Network density -4.865*** -5.494*** -5.477*** -6.015*** -5.135*** 
 (0.376) (0.496) (0.519) (0.576) (0.451) 
Homophily according to Variety of Capitalism 
Coordinated Market 
Economies 1.252
*** 1.178** 1.167** 1.143* 1.177** 
 (0.484) (0.569) (0.593) (0.564) (0.553) 
Dependent Market 
Economies 0.744
** 1.670*** 1.836*** 2.250*** 1.168*** 
 
(0.319) (0.514) (0.577) (0.605) (0.440) 
Government ownership 0.577** 0.800** 0.841* 0.928* 0.536 
 (0.257) (0.402) (0.444) (0.479) (0.360) 
Mixed Market Economies 0.586 0.416 0.397 0.452 0.911*  
(0.394) (0.507) (0.512) (0.560) (0.470) 
Nordic Market Economies 1.494* 1.508 1.583* 1.625 1.448* 
 (0.801) (0.918) (0.917) (0.949) (0.843) 
Varieties of Capitalism and incoming ties 
Coordinated Market 
Economies 
 0.980** 0.977** 1.106**  
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  (0.462) (0.483) (0.502)  
Dependent Market 
Economies  
Reference 
category 
Reference 
category 
Reference 
category  
      
Government ownership  0.654 0.635 0.667  
  (0.475) (0.498) (0.518)  
Liberal Market Economies  1.989*** 1.871*** 1.863***  
  (0.517) (0.610) (0.615)  
Mixed Market Economies  0.993** 0.958* 0.974**    (0.460) (0.492) (0.494)  
Nordic Market Economies  0.895* 0.883* 0.942*  
  (0.492) (0.510) (0.523)  
Effect of resources on outgoing ties 
Staff (2012)   -0.144   
   (0.188)   
Budget (2012)   0.197 0.261*  
   (0.172) (0.143)  
Staff size (Full time equivalents, 2016): 
Large (>170)    Reference 
category 
 
     
Medium (90-140)    0.978***  
    (0.353)  
Medium-small (50-75)    -0.173  
    (0.506)  
Small (12-50)    0.750  
    (0.473)  
      
Micro (>12)    -0.173  (0.690)  
Varieties of Capitalism and outgoing ties 
Coordinated Market 
Economies 
    0.522 
     (0.415) 
Dependent Market 
Economies     
Reference 
category 
      
Government ownership     0.465 
     (0.434) 
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Liberal Market Economies     1.416*** 
     (0.492) 
Mixed Market Economies     0.059      (0.458) 
Nordic Market Economies     0.464 
     (0.469) 
Controls 
Co-membership in Regional 
Initiatives for Electricity 
0.361** 0.550*** 0.578*** 0.685*** 0.501*** 
(0.172) (0.196) (0.204) (0.219) (0.192) 
Co-membership in Regional 
Initiatives for Gas 
0.154 0.130 0.101 -0.092 0.106 
(0.238) (0.246) (0.251) (0.276) (0.247) 
Cross border electricity 
flows 
0.627*** 0.576*** 0.580*** 0.580*** 0.588*** 
(0.191) (0.188) (0.197) (0.181) (0.171) 
Cross border gas flows 0.052 0.016 0.013 0.085 0.035 
 (0.097) (0.096) (0.095) (0.102) (0.105) 
Endogenous dependencies      
Reciprocity 1.967*** 1.956*** 1.899*** 1.801*** 1.905*** 
 (0.394) (0.383) (0.393) (0.396) (0.383) 
Activity 3.022** 2.263 2.360 4.099* 2.800* 
 (1.487) (1.468) (1.451) (2.126) (1.623) 
Popularity -0.187 -0.158 -0.209 -0.418 -0.336 
 (0.830) (0.914) (0.886) (0.928) (0.866) 
Shared partners 0.051 0.061* 0.067* 0.077** 0.053* 
 (0.031) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.028) 
Transitivity 1.073*** 0.932*** 0.908*** 0.880*** 1.008*** 
 (0.218) (0.223) (0.232) (0.235) (0.234) 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 494.559 489.868 492.298 483.653 496.646 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 565.052 583.858 595.687 601.840 590.636 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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i I have included the energy regulatory authority of Norway in this analysis because the regulatory 
authority is a member of the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), the voluntary network of 
European energy regulators, and the country has an obligation to comply with the provisions of the 
EU energy law. I have not included the NRA of Iceland because it is not compelled to adopt the EU 
legal framework in energy. 
ii The EU energy legislation mandates the unbundling (or separation) of the network infrastructure, 
consisting of the separation of high voltage/capacity (transmission) and low voltage/capacity 
(distribution) grids from the potentially competitive segments of the electricity and gas sectors, i.e. 
generation/production and supply. Previously, production and investment decisions were made 
within a single vertically integrated, usually state-owned energy company. The unbundling of 
generation of electricity (and gas production) from transmission, distribution and supply is meant to 
ensure that coordination between energy demand, supply and construction of infrastructure happens 
through market signals (as per the LME model). 
iii In half of the cases I obtained regulators’ replies over the phone. Because the question asked during 
phone conversations was identical to those in the email messages, there is no need to account for 
whether regulators responded to the email or were contacted by phone in the models. 
iv A matrix reporting electricity flows in both directions across EU Member States in GWh in 2015. 
Data from ENTSO-E website, https://www.entsoe.eu/publications/statistics/electricity-in-
europe/Pages/default.aspx (last accessed 3 November 2017). 
v A matrix reporting gas flows in both directions across EU Member States in cubic meters of gas in 
2015. Data from UK government website 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/579632/Physical_
gas_flows_across_Europe_in_2015.pdf (last accessed 3 November 2017). 
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vi An affiliation matrix of the Regional initiatives in Electricity and Gas. Data from ACER website, 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/electricity/regional_initiatives/pages/default.aspx and 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/gas/regional_%20intiatives/pages/gas-regional-iniciatives.aspx (last 
accessed 3 November 2017). 
vii The budget and staff numbers of each the regulatory authority in 2012 (for lack of more recent 
data). Data from the European Commission DG Energy website 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-consumers/single-market-progress-report 
Country reports 2014, last accessed on 3 November 2017, complemented with regulatory 
authorities’ annual reports in some cases. 
viii The syntax of ERG Models comprises a wealth of terms. The ones used in this model are outlined 
here below:  
- “edgecov” : the input is a matrix of covariates; a positive coefficient indicates the probability that 
two nodes sharing the same characteristic are also ties (e.g. are part to the same Regional grouping); 
- “nodeicov” : it tests whether a certain attribute of the node affects its in-degree (e.g. more resources 
are associated with significantly higher odds of incoming ties); 
- “nodeocov” : same as nodeicov, but for out-degree; 
- “nodeifactor” : same as nodeicov, but for categorical variables; 
- “nodeofactor” : same as nodeocov, but for categorical variables; 
- “nodematch” : it tests for homophily, i.e. the probability that two nodes that match on the given 
characteristic (e.g. two regulators who are both from Western European countries) share a tie; 
- “absdiff” : similar to nodematch but for continuous covariates. 
ix Categorical data on staff figures by regulatory authorities referring to 2016 on the ACER website, 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/official_documents/other%20documents/acer%20taking%20stock%20o
f%20the%20regulators’%20human%20resources%20summary%20of%20findings.pdf I combined the 
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“Large” and “Medium Large” categories, as the latter only contained two regulatory authorities (last 
accessed 3 November 2017).  
x Eurostat energy statistics http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/energy/data/main-tables (last 
accessed 3 November 2017) 
xi Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia. 
xii Bulgaria and Romania.  
xiii Annual Reports of National Regulatory Authorities can be downloaded at 
https://www.ceer.eu/eer_publications/national_reports (last accessed 3 November 2017). 
